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INTRODUCTION 
Public administration has the propensity to experience ‘identity crises’ (Waldo, 1968). Previous 
studies suggest that over the decades there has been a continuous movement in public 
administration systems from traditional Public Administration (PA) ideas to managerial ones, 
later labelled as New Public Management (NPM) reforms, and more recently, towards a more 
participative approach utilising partnerships and networks, referred to as New Public 
Governance (NPG). Each of these systems is associated with its own accounting, budgeting and 
performance measurement tools and techniques. The three systems are often presented as 
mutually exclusive and competing (Rhodes, 1997; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; and Prestoff et al., 
2012). However, the claim that there has been a progressive movement along a continuum from 
PA to NPM, and ultimately to NPG, has also been contested (Pollitt, 2007; and Lapsley, 2008). 
While there have been a number of studies looking at the implementation of accounting reforms 
associated with these systems (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007; and Connolly and Hyndman, 
2006), little is known about the political debate preceding these reforms and on whether this 
follows the direction some of the literature would suggest.  
The objective of this study is to explore whether a convincing movement towards NPG 
ideas can be identified at the level of political debate; and to what extent the ideas embedded 
within PA, NPM and NPG systems show themselves in the political discussions regarding public 
sector accounting and budgeting reforms. Has the emphasis of political debate on these three 
systems changed over the last eighteen years? To what extent does this suggest a movement 
along a continuum from PA towards NPG, with NPM merely a transitory state on the journey? 
Has a movement along a continuum (if any) led to a replacement of previous ideas? The paper 
focuses on the accounting, budgeting and performance measurement changes that took place in 
the United Kingdom (UK) central government from the 1990s and, through a document 
analysis, explores the extent to which the language used in the documents mirrors any of the old 
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and new public administration reform vocabularies. In particular, we investigate, over time, the 
relative use, and change in use, of the language related to PA, NPM and NPG.  
The paper aims to contribute to the on-going discussion on public sector reforms and 
their evolution towards an increasingly NPG-like approach (Osborne, 2006 and 2010; Pollitt, 
2007; and Lapsley, 2008). The findings suggest that the political debate regarding accounting 
reforms in official UK political documents has predominantly, but not exclusively, utilised NPM 
arguments, with little evidence of a ‘NPG-era’ even in the later periods. In particular, while PA, 
NPM and NPG are often, although not always (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011), presented in the 
literature as mutually exclusive, competing schemes, the results of this research suggest that in 
political debate they are viewed as complementary, with decisions taken that result in layering, 
rather than replacement, of systems. On the basis of the analysis, there is very limited evidence 
to support the claim that NPM is a transitory state in the evolution from a regime of traditional 
PA to NPG. The paper is organised as follows: the following section reviews existing literature 
on the three public administration systems (namely PA, NPM and NPG); then the methods and 
the document analysis are presented; finally, after a section discussing the emerging results, the 
conclusions present final remarks and identify further research avenues. 
 
PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS AND IDEAS OVER THE LAST EIGHTEEN YEARS 
Since the 1970s many governments have engaged in reform processes aimed at bringing business 
concepts, techniques and values into the public sector (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). This 
movement has been termed NPM and often resulted in major shifts in accounting, budgeting 
and performance measurement systems as a basis for better management and more appropriate 
accountability (Connolly and Hyndman, 2006). As a consequence, it is argued that there has been 
(Hood, 1995), and indeed should be (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), a significant and progressive 
movement away from traditional bureaucratic PA systems, in favour of NPM-type management 
and accounting tools and ideas inspired by the private sector. International comparisons of 
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NPM-style reforms across a number of countries indicate that these reforms are being 
implemented at a quicker pace and more enthusiastically in some countries compared to others 
(Hood, 1995; and Flynn and Strehl, 1996). For example, Hood (1995) produced an analysis 
outlining the degree of NPM intensity in various countries and their national governments’ 
political orientation at that time. He argued that political orientation (and right-wing 
governments) could not explain the degree of implementation of NPM ideas. An alternative 
view, indicated by Flynn and Strehl (1996), suggests that NPM ideas require an ideological 
commitment that is likely to be stronger among conservatives than socialists or social democrats. 
However, there are exceptions to this, as Bach and Bordogna (2011) also showed that in a group 
of core ‘NPM enthusiasts’ (Anglophone countries characterised by a majoritarian political 
system, an individualist pro-market culture and strong governance systems), NPM-inspired 
reforms have been more consistently pursued, regardless of the political hue of the government. 
The UK has been proposed as one of these ‘enthusiasts’. 
More recently, an increasing body of literature has identified, under the banner of NPG, 
a new focus on governance systems to steer public services and actors (Osborne, 2010; and 
Prestoff et al., 2012). In what could be viewed as a reaction to the fragmentation of the public 
sector through the adoption of NPM ideas, NPG focuses on the need for networks, rather than 
hierarchies and markets, as a means of making governments more effective and legitimate 
(Osborne, 2010; and Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). According to these studies, NPM is dead 
(Dunleavy at al., 2006) and we have now entered an era of ‘governance without government’, as 
a mode of de-bureaucratised, hybrid societal steering (Klijn, 2008; and Lynn, 2010). 
 
Traditional Public Administration  
PA systems, the ideas of which have dominated public service delivery regimes since the late 
nineteenth century to the early 1980s, have at their heart the rule of law. Here, politics and 
administration are clearly separated (with the former prevailing on the latter) and the hegemony 
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of professionals is dominant with respect to public service delivery (Hood, 1991). From a 
historical perspective, traditional PA could itself be regarded as a major reform movement. 
Instead of public administration being carried out by amateurs often appointed on the basis of 
connection, the task of administering public organisations was professionalised, and efficiency 
and appointment on merit became key. PA is most commonly linked with the ideas of Weber 
(1947) and is characterised by: an administration under the formal control of the political 
leadership, fixed spheres of competence, defined hierarchies, full-time, permanent and neutral 
officials, specialisation and expertise as the basis for action, clear distinction between the public 
and private roles of officials, and management by the application of developed rules (Politt and 
Bouckaert, 2011). 
With respect to accounting, the budget often plays a central role as a basis for the 
political negotiation and the (generally incremental) allocation of resources among different 
political programmes and purposes, with the budget seen as a political act which translates 
political goals into appropriations of financial resources (Wildavsky, 1964; and Liguori et al., 
2012). Attention is focused on the legitimacy of the budget process and, ex-post, on the 
comparison between actual and authorised expenditure (ter Bogt, 2003), with accounting 
primarily intended to ensure compliance and curtail spending. Strict rules, standardised 
procedures and a focus on cash are at the heart of the accounting system. 
 
New Public Management reforms 
While there was a massive expansion in the role of the state between 1945 and the early 1970s, 
driven in the main by rising expectations and the demand for greater equality, from the 1970s 
onwards serious questioning of such expansion began to emerge. Possible reasons for this are 
financial distress, social changes, globalisation, increased competition, and changing perceptions 
of the state (for a discussion of these see Hyndman and McGeough, 2008). Such questioning 
forced governments to consider the role of the state, the manner in which public services were 
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delivered to citizens and the accountability of the public sector. Consequently, the management 
of public sectors in a number of western countries has changed with, collectively, these changes 
being referred to as NPM.  
Hood (1991) suggested that NPM is a convenient, though a rather loose, term that is a 
shorthand for a set of broadly similar administrative doctrines that dominated the reform agenda 
in the public sector in many OECD countries. NPM reforms typically have evolved around six 
dimensions: privatisation, marketisation, decentralisation, output orientation, quality systems and 
intensity of implementation (Pollitt and Summa, 1997). This is evidenced in the UK public sector 
by, among other things, the increasing adoption of private-sector managerial techniques, the 
development of market mechanisms and the break-up of large units of government into smaller 
quasi-autonomous units. These adjustments have been viewed as ways of improving 
accountability by public sector bodies, and decision making within public sector bodies, and have 
drawn heavily on new accounting, budgeting and performance measurement systems (Hyndman 
et al., 2007; and Lapsley, 2008). In the field of accounting, many governments that have 
embraced NPM ideas have also adopted the accruals basis of accounting (as opposed to a cash 
basis), private sector style financial statements (vs. budget out-turn reports relating to cash 
spent), decentralised budgets (vs. strong central control of budgets), flexibility in budget carry 
forward (in place of strict annuality) and a focus on performance reporting relating spend to 
outputs and achievements (in place of a focus on the control of inputs). Objectives, targets and 
identification of the cost of individual services to permit rational choice also tend to feature 
prominently in accounting systems supporting NPM reforms.   
A number of authors have suggested that in many reform experiences, these new ideas 
and tools, rather than replace existing systems with better systems, have a tendency to perpetrate 
old logics and behaviours, often making public organisations more formalised and bureaucratic 
than previously (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; and Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). It has been argued 
that the initial enthusiasm relating to NPM reforms has declined over time, so that NPM is now 
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in its middle age. This is as a consequence of reformers ignoring or downplaying its paradoxes 
and side effects, and being overconfident in the general efficacy of the remedies they initially 
advocated (Hood and Peters, 2004). Some authors have even claimed that NPM is dead, 
although others contest this (Dunleavy at al., 2006; Pollitt, 2007; Lapsley, 2008; and Osborne, 
2010).  
 
New Public Governance reforms 
In the last two decades a plethora of ideas relating to ‘governance’ have gradually emerged to 
challenge both traditional PA and NPM reforms (Rhodes, 1997; and Osborne, 2006 and 2010). 
Governance is argued to entail the steering of society through networks and partnerships 
between governments, businesses and other forms of civil society (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). 
Osborne (2010) opines that NPM, rather than being the final destination of a reform process, 
has (p.1) ‘been a transitory state in the evolution’ from a regime of traditional PA to NPG. He 
contends that both traditional PA and NPM reforms fail (p.5) ‘to capture the complex reality of 
the design, delivery and management of public services in the twenty-first century’ and calls for a 
more sophisticated understanding of public policy adoption, implementation and public service 
delivery.  
It is argued (Osborne, 2006) that NPG reforms (as compared with NPM systems): have 
their theoretical roots in sociology and network theory (rather than rational management and 
public choice); assume a plural and pluralist state (rather than a disaggregated state); focus on 
inter-organisational governance (rather than intra-organisational management); emphasise service 
processes and outcomes (rather than service inputs and outputs); relate to external non-public 
organisational partners with ongoing preferred-supplier relationships (rather than market 
relationships); use trust and relational contracts as governance mechanisms (rather than market 
mechanisms); and place their faith in neo-corporatist values (rather than the efficacy of 
competition and the market place). These ideas, however, have also been accompanied by a 
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partial rediscovery of rule and legal principles, where the state, with its own rules, methods and 
culture, fundamentally remains the key actor (Hupe et al., 2000).  
The concept of governance, as part of the NPG changes, is not an alternative to 
government, but represents a wider and more inclusive system of ideas, based on partnerships 
among government, business and citizens’ associations. The emphasis is shifted towards 
networks, partnerships and negotiated voluntary cooperation, rather than competition or 
hierarchies. NPG reforms move away from an emphasis on traditional hierarchical forms of 
organisation and focus on more devolved and participative (task-specific) controls (Rhodes, 
1997). They build on ideas relating to more efficient and flexible service delivery procedures 
(concepts first highlighted in the NPM approach) to answer the needs of an increasingly diverse 
citizenry and acknowledge an increased complexity of public sector accountability mechanisms 
as a response to increasing numbers of stakeholders and ambiguous objectives (Rhodes, 1997; 
and Christensen and Lægreid, 2011). With such reforms, the focus of accounting techniques 
moves more and more towards the reassurance of social efficacy and effectiveness (highlighting 
the ensuring of citizens’ satisfaction and attention to outcomes), as well as external accountability 
and transparency (European Commission, 2001). According to Ackerman (2012), accountability 
is meant to stimulate citizens’ participation, favouring ex-ante, proactive and horizontal systems.  
In such systems transparency and participative endeavours come to the fore. 
 
METHOD 
This paper investigates the language and the change in the vocabularies used in relation to the 
three main public sector reforms identified by the literature (i.e. PA, NPM and NPG), with a 
particular focus on accounting, budgeting and performance measurement systems. In particular, 
we aim to explore, over time, whether NPG ideas and vocabularies defined a change of scene in 
the political debate, as recent literature would predict (Osborne, 2006 and 2010; and Ackerman, 
2012). This is interpreted in the context of the changes decided in the UK central government 
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during the 1990s and 2000s (here split into four consecutive periods to identify changes, if any, 
over time). The history of the changes was reconstructed on the basis of the relevant official 
reform documents, archival materials (such as published articles) and interviews with central 
government managers (see Table 1). The analysis of documents was facilitated using a textual 
analysis approach. The discursive dynamics were reconstructed on the basis of specific text 
genres that were included in documents that accompanied the legislative process1. These 
comprised a total of 45 documents (2,440 pages) including: (i) text of an enacted law in 
parliament’s national archives; (ii) explanatory notes to the Resource Accounting and Budgeting 
(RAB) bill (the only relevant bill issued over the analysed period), accounting for the background 
and rationale of the law and its amendments; (iii) administrative reports which explored areas 
with some significant focus on accounting and budgeting reform (such as reports discussing how 
accountability might be discharged or performance measured) issued by governmental and 
parliamentary committees2; and (iv) transcripts of the first and the final bill discussions in both 
chambers of parliament (House of Commons and House of Lords) and parliamentary committee 
reports examining modifications to the law or existing administrative regulation.  
PA, NPM and NPG have characteristic standard narratives, vocabularies, ideas, concepts 
and instruments (Mills, 1940) that signify adherence to its major thrusts. In order to identify the 
systems and reforms that the texts invoked, we developed a dictionary of such ‘signature 
elements’ or ‘cues’ (verbal expressions that suggest one of the core concepts that the literature 
proposes for each system) (Hyndman et al., 2014). The dictionary of cues used is reported in 
Appendix 1. For example: references to efficiency, contract, agencification or competition were used to 
identify commitment to the NPM reform agenda; NPG was associated with words/phrases such 
as networks, citizen participation, transparency or external accountability; PA was identified in relation to 
such cues as rule, compliance or procedure. With some of these cues, there is a degree of overlap, and 
it could be debated as to whether they should be related to one particular system or another. For 
instance, accountability and consolidation represent cues utilised by both NPM and NPG reforms. In 
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these cases, previous research was reviewed to identify the extent to which the literature 
expressed the cue as being central to a specific system, or firstly introduced under a certain 
reform (see concepts such as citizen for PA or contracting-out, PPP and PFI for NPM – Hood, 
1991; and Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000 and 2011). The cue was located in the system where the 
strongest case was made. In addition, it should be noted that our analysis exceeds an automatic 
search or quantitative counting of words: the dictionary greatly aided the coding, but all 
documents were read by the coders in detail and it was left to the coders’ interpretation whether 
a keyword was used to cue a particular commitment to a system or not. Data coding and analysis 
were supported by the software ATLAS.ti.6.  
A statement can draw on a specific cue to either endorse or criticise a particular system 
or reform agenda. To identify this, we distinguished between ‘positive/neutral’ (i.e. supporting 
codes – PA1, NPM1 and NPG1 codes) versus ‘negative’ (i.e. criticising or challenging codes – 
PA2, NPM2 and PG2) usage of the cue words within each vocabulary. In order to increase 
internal validity and reliability, the codebook was applied to each of the documents 
independently by two researchers, with all cases of disagreement reviewed and resolved by 
discussion. The unit of analysis was the paragraph. The weighted number of occurrences, and 
occurrences per page, related to the three systems (distinguishing between positive and negative 
cues) is shown in Tables 2 and 3. 
For the analysis of the relative prevalence of each system (PA, NPM or NPG), we 
counted the number of occurrences of different signature cues within each paragraph3. For 
example, when four different NPM1 codes, supporting NPM arguments, occurred in a single 
paragraph, the paragraph was ‘weighted’ as NPM1 multiplied by four. In addition, in order to 
explore the extent to which cues relating to different (arguably competing) systems existed 
together, we explored their co-occurrence by assigning binary codes to each paragraph, 
indicating whether specific reform discourses were present or not. For instance: when an NPM1 
code occurred four times in a paragraph together with two PA1 codes, the paragraph was 
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counted once as a PA1/NPM1 co-occurrence; whereas when a PA1 code appeared in a 
paragraph three times with no other code, it was counted once as a PA1 alone. Finally, to 
identify the main specific cues in each system being used, the main keywords (i.e. words 
accounting for over 5% of the hits in one system in any of the four periods) were collected and 
analysed. The co-occurrence counts for various combinations of codes are presented in Table 4, 
with a snapshot of commonly used system-related keywords outlined in Table 5. 
 
CHANGES IN ACCOUNTING, BUDGETING AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
SYSTEMS: A UK PERSPECTIVE 
At the beginning of the 1990s, accounting, budgeting and performance measurement in the UK 
central government featured cash budgeting with strict annuality requirements, cash accounting, 
and limited performance measurement and performance management. During the two following 
decades (the 1990s and the 2000s), major changes associated with a modernisation agenda were 
introduced. Key features of these are presented in Table 1.  
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
In the 1990s, as far as accounting is concerned, a major change pertained to the 
announcement relating to the introduction of accrual-based accounting. The arguments for using 
the accrual model, in place of cash accounting, gained prominence and acceptance, and a move 
from the cash basis was agreed for central government. This was eventually implemented in the 
early 2000s under the title of Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB). Resource accounting, 
which extends beyond the cash-based accounting used previously by applying accrual principles 
to central government department accounting, also sought to integrate objectives and targets into 
the accounting system (implemented in full by 2001). In addition, on the management 
accounting side, a subsequent move to resource budgeting, in order to make the management 
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accounts align with the external accounts in central government, was made (implemented in full 
by 2003). The position of accrual accounting was further embedded by the decision in 1998 to 
produce Whole of Government Accounts (WGA) (a consolidated set of accrual financial 
statements for the UK public sector, consolidating around 1,500 bodies), although the first set of 
WGA was not produced until 20114.  
With respect to performance measurement and management, in the 1980s there had 
already been calls for a greater focus on such issues, which could be seen clearly in the Financial 
Management Initiative (HM Government, 1982). Since the 1990s, performance measurement and 
reporting became integral parts of the development of RAB and came again to the fore in the 
introduction of Public Service Agreements (PSAs) and Service Delivery Agreements (SDAs) in 
1998. In these, central government departments were held accountable for service delivery 
through the targets set out in their PSAs and SDAs.   
Finally, in the realm of budgeting, major changes also occurred. As alluded to above (and 
shown in Table 1), the move from cash budgeting to resource (accrual) budgeting was 
announced in the mid 1990s and was ‘live’ by 2003. In addition, annuality (the requirement for 
budget allocations to be spent by the financial year-end or be surrendered to the centre) was 
abolished in 1997 at central government departmental level with end-year flexibility (EYF) being 
permitted (allowing the carry forward of unspent resources from one year to the next). 
Moreover, in 1998, Treasury-led Spending Reviews were initiated to set firm and fixed spending 
budgets over several years for each government department rather than rely on single-period 
budgeting.  
 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS: CHANGES IN A SHADE OF … NPM 
PA, NPM and NPG in the UK political debate 
A synopsis of the cues linked to the three main reform waves (PA, NPM and NPG) over an 
eighteen-year period (1991-2008) is provided in Table 2. This shows, in absolute and percentage 
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terms, the ‘weighted’ number of occurrences of different signature cues within each paragraph, 
categorised in each of the six possible codes (a negative and a positive code for each of the three 
systems). Table 3 shows the same counts normalised by the total number of pages in the 
documents for each of the periods.  
Both tables give us a clear picture, where ideas supporting NPM systems, techniques and 
logics (identified by NPM1 codes) prevail overall with an average of 63.5% (see Table 2) and 3.5 
cues per page of document (Table 3). NPM is clearly the most represented and discussed reform 
system in the political debate throughout the whole period and is almost always presented in 
positive terms (NPM2 cues only occurring in 1.1% of cases in eighteen years). NPM surpasses 
the traditional PA system, which showed an average of 24.9% positive (PA1) cues over the 
period (1.37 cues per page of document). However, cues relating to PA clearly persisted in the 
UK discussions, notwithstanding the multiple waves of managerial and accounting 
modernisation. The utilisation of traditional PA cues, supportive of PA ideas (PA1), increased 
proportionately in the 1990s before reducing in the 2000s.  
In terms of occurrence, NPM1 arguments remained high in each of the four periods 
(well over 50% in each period), being at their highest in the first period (70.2%), before 
decreasing in the second period to 54.3% and increasing again to over 65% in each of the last 
two periods. A similar oscillating pattern, at a much lower level, occurred with PA1 cues, with 
peaks and troughs occurring almost as mirror images of NPM1 (understandably so, as these two 
codes dominated the analysis over the four periods, accounting for over 85% of cues in each 
period). 
Although the use of NPG1 cues remained relatively low throughout the entire period 
(averaging only 7.6% of total cues and 0.42 cues per page), it grew consistently from a minimal 
level in the first period (5.5%) to a significantly higher level in the fourth period (13.2%). It is 
interesting to note that there was very limited use of negative cues (PA2, NPM2 or NPG2) in the 
documents. Indeed, looking at each of the systems (PA, NPM and NPG), on average, over the 
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four periods, these accounted for only 2.8% (PA2), 1.1% (NPM2) and 0.1% (NPG2) of the total 
cues and were never more than 4% in any one period (Table 2).  
 
Insert Table 2 and Table 3 here 
 
The co-occurrence counts for the main combinations of codes (e.g. PA1/NPM1, 
PA1/NPG1, PA1 alone, etc.) are highlighted in Table 4 together with the percentage of the total 
number of paragraphs in each period (a detailed overview is presented for each of the three 
systems separately – PA, NPM and NPG). The less occurring combinations of codes are 
collapsed into the ‘Other’ column. Considering the PA system first (the upper third of Table 4), 
it can be seen that PA arguments (which were present in 2,767 paragraphs in the eighteen-year 
period) were mostly presented together with NPM ones, and overwhelmingly in a positive 
manner. The most usual code combinations were PA1/NPM1 (48.4% over the entire eighteen-
year period) and PA1 alone (38.9% of paragraphs), although the prevalence of one of these over 
the other fluctuated between periods. In the period 1991-1995, 53.1% of paragraphs were 
PA1/NPM1 compared with 37.3% PA1 alone; in the subsequent period, PA1 alone was more 
widespread. No other code combinations using PA arguments were particularly frequently 
identified (averaging less than 5% over the eighteen-year period) in any of the four periods.  
This picture is reversed for NPM arguments (the middle third of Table 4), where it is 
seen that NPM arguments (which surfaced in 5,425 paragraphs in total in the entire period under 
consideration) most commonly appeared in positive terms and by themselves (NPM1 alone) 
within a paragraph, rather than being associated with any other reform system. This is true in 
each of the four periods. For example, in the period 1991-1995 65.7% of paragraphs were 
NPM1 alone (59.2% for the entire eighteen-year period). The next most frequent code 
combination was NPM1/PA1 (24.7% of the NPM paragraphs over the eighteen years). .  
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With respect to NPG arguments (the lower third of Table 4), these were present in a 
total of only 936 paragraphs over the eighteen-year period. On average, they appeared more 
frequently in a positive hue (NPG1) in combination with positive NPM1 arguments 
(NPG1/NPM1 accounting for 41.6% of all NPG paragraphs during the eighteen-year period), 
although this was not consistent through the four periods. The other most prevalent code 
combinations were NPG1 alone (29.7% of paragraphs) and NPG1/PA1/NPM1 (14.5% of 
paragraphs). NPG1 alone, in particular, was the most frequently occurring code during the 
periods 1996-1999 (31%) and 2004-2008 (40.3%); although, in the latter case, it was the result of 
an analysis of the only 67 paragraphs available for the period.  
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
To explore the use of particular, system-related (PA, NPM or NPG) words in the 
political debate regarding accounting, budgeting and performance measurement, an analysis of 
the prevalence of the specific cues used (see Appendix 1) was also undertaken. This is reflected 
in Table 5, which focuses on the weighted counts of the main keywords and shows an example 
of the extent to which the relative use of common system-related words ebbs and flows over the 
period considered. For presentation purposes, we define a keyword as any one of the Appendix 
1 original cues that accounts for over 5% of the hits in any one system (PA, NPM or NPG) in 
any one of the four periods. Given this, the total percentages of the keywords in any one system 
shown in Table 5 are less than 100% in any period, and the individual system-related counts are 
greater than the sum of the total for the keywords. In line with the previous analysis contained in 
Table 2, the total overall counts for PA, NPM and NPG were very different (9,973 PA cues, 
18,367 NPM cues and 2,525 NPG cues), and therefore care must be taken in interpreting the 
percentage information. Similarly, the much higher number of words analysed in the middle two 
periods (1996-1999 and 2000-2003) reflects the higher numbers of documents in these periods.  
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With respect to PA, cash/commitment, expenditure and spending were by far the most 
prevalent words, particularly in the first three periods, where together, in each of the periods, 
they accounted for over 60% of all PA cues (Table 5). This fell to 56.3% in the last period (2004-
2008), as citizen, a PA cue hardly used in other periods, emerged more strongly. In the case of 
NPM, the keywords resources, audit/auditing and cost were the most prevalent, together accounting 
for over 50% of the NPM words in the entire period (although this was much lower in the 2004-
2008 period at 19.7%). NPM performance-related cues (such as objective, performance and target) 
together accounted for only 6.9% of the NPM cues in the entire period, but a much higher 
proportion in the later periods (10.9% of NPM words in period three – 2000-2003, and 19.9% in 
period four – 2004-2008). With NPG, by far the most common cues used over the entire period 
were accountability and consolidation/consolidated (words that are also borderline with NPM ideas) 
that together accounted for 52.1% of the overall NPG words (Table 5). Of note is the fact that 
integration/integrated, network and governance emerged as keywords in period four (2004-2008), 
although they were hardly present at all in earlier periods. Governance, in particular, emerged 
strongly, accounting for 34.8% of NPG hits in the last period.  
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
The following subsections explore the four periods under analysis in more detail, paying 
particular attention to the parallel between the proposed changes and the ideas and arguments 
actually being discussed in each period. 
 
The early RAB years: 1991-1995 
The domination of NPM-related topics in the political debate regarding accounting, budgeting 
and performance measurement particularly coincided in the mid-1990s with the discussions 
around the Green (HM Treasury, 1994) and the White (HM Treasury, 1995) papers (both finally 
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converging into the RAB bill in 2000). As a consequence of these RAB-related proposals, and 
the discussion surrounding them, in the first period under consideration (1991-1995), over 70% 
of the cues in the documents relating to accounting utilised the language associated with NPM in 
a positive manner (NPM1) (Table 2). When we look at Table 5 and the way specific keywords 
appear, in this period NPM cues such as cost (16.7% of the NPM keywords) and especially 
resources in accrual terms (30.9% of NPM keywords) came to the fore. This is unsurprising given 
the widespread discussion of RAB in the political debate. At this time, language positively 
associated with PA ideas (PA1) was present, but much more muted (20.2% of the total cues, 
Table 2), while positive NPG cues (NPG1) were almost absent (5.5% of the total cues).   
If we look at the co-occurrences across the different reform vocabularies during this 
period, arguments in favour of PA were mostly presented together with NPM ones (Table 4). 
Between 1991 and 1995, 53.1% of the times it was present, PA1 co-occurred together with 
positive NPM arguments, and only 37.3% of the times by itself. This picture is reversed for 
NPM, which largely appeared by itself, rather than associated with any of the other systems. This 
co-occurrence of PA1/NPM1 is particularly reflected in the concurrent use of cost and expense 
cues (used in an NPM1 sense) with the PA1 cues of cash and expenditure in discussions and 
debates on RAB (Table 5). This suggests a complementarity of arguments, rather than a 
competition between system-related arguments. Furthermore, between 1991 and 1995, although 
in 33% of the paragraphs where it was present NPG appeared by itself in a positive mode 
(NPG1), it was more often accompanied by arguments supporting NPM-type changes 
(NPG1/NPM1 – 50.5%). Ideas related to all three systems (PA, NPM and NPG) were rarely 
present together.  
 
The emergence of PSAs, SDAs, EYF and WGA: 1996-1999 
The second half of the 1990s saw an increase in all the system codes (Table 2), consistent with 
the increased number of documents and pages of accounting-related political debate in the 
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period (Table 3). While positive NPM cues (NPM1) continued to be most pervasive, and 
increased in numbers, they accounted for a lower proportion of total cues than in the earlier 
period (54.3% compared with 70.2% in 1991-1995, see Table 2), suggesting no movement from 
PA to NPM ideas at this time in the political debate. The number and proportion of both PA 
and NPG codes rose.  
In this period, performance measurement and reporting continued to be identified and 
discussed as integral parts of the development of RAB. Additionally, it was further embedded by 
the development of PSAs and SDAs in 1998 (Table 1). In 1997, annuality was abolished at 
central government departmental level with EYF being permitted (see Table 1)5. The use of 
accrual accounting was further embedded by the decision in 1998 to undertake a scoping study 
with the objective of producing WGA. In the same year, the Treasury introduced a more 
structured Spending Review process.  
These changes covered old and new areas of central government accounting and thus led 
to an increase in the use of terms supporting all the three systems (Table 5): the old PA, 
reinvigorated by the focus on expenditure and cash, never forgotten, and again emphasised in the 
Spending Review; the newly introduced NPM (with performance-related cues like objective, 
performance and target increasing in use, as well as cost, audit and resources); and the incubating NPG 
(with growing use of accountability, transparency and, related to WGA, consolidation cues). This is also 
the period where the most was written in relation to accounting, budgeting and performance 
measurement reforms (1,083 pages, see Table 3), surpassing even the years 2000-2003 when the 
RAB bill was approved and published.  
In this period PA, NPM and NPG were presented mainly independently (i.e. as 
standalones) in each paragraph (Table 4). The three systems of ideas only co-occurred 
marginally, with the exception of when the NPG cues were examined. NPG1 appeared together 
with positive NPM and PA cues in 19.7% of the NPG paragraphs, the highest proportion over 
the four periods (and much higher than any three way co-occurrence when considering NPM 
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and PA cues). This might suggest the rise of a new set of ideas (which would be identified later 
in the literature as NPG reforms). These ideas were grafted into the political debate, but could 
not, at this point, be recognised as a self-standing paradigm. 
 
The RAB era: 2000-2003 
The move from cash budgeting to resource (accrual) budgeting announced in the mid-1990s 
went ‘live’ in 2003 (Table 1). Previously, in 2001, resource (accrual) accounting had become 
operational in all central government departments with performance-related Statements of Resources 
by Departmental Aims and Objectives as part of this RAB change. In the 2000-2003 period, the NPM 
and NPG occurrences increased (in terms of counts and percentage of hits). For example, 
positive NPM (NPM1) hits increased from 2,677 (2.47 per page; 54.3% of all hits) in 1996-1999 
to 4,226 hits (4.74 per page; 68.7% of all hits) in 2000-2003. A similar pattern was observed with 
positive NPG (NPG1) cues, but at much lower levels (Tables 2 and 3). At the same time, there 
was a clear decrease in the relative presence of PA-supporting arguments (Table 2): this is 
highlighted by the co-occurrences, where positive PA cues in a standalone mode (PA1 alone) 
were much less frequently found (26.9% of paragraphs compared with 46% in the immediately 
preceding period – see Table 4). The decline of this traditional set of ideas might echo the 
coming into play of the managerial RAB-related reforms, a few years after them being 
announced. What had been seeded is now becoming more and more visible. For example, given 
the introduction of RAB during this period, the fact that keywords such as auditing (accounting 
for 18.7% of the NPM cues) and resources (27.7% of the NPM cues) were pervasive in the 
political debate was perhaps not unexpected (Table 5).  
A more definite split across the old (PA) and the new (NPM and NPG) systems is also 
visible in the lower co-occurrence rate of PA1, NPM1 and NPG1 together (12.8% of NPG 
paragraphs in this period, down from 19.7% in the previous period – Table 4) and in the 
substantial stability of the main terms (such as cash, expenditure and spending) used to support PA 
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systems (Table 5). While the old PA world crystallises, and, being already embedded in the 
culture, perhaps does not require further emphasis or slogans for it to be embraced, in the new 
NPG realm things keep moving and the related terminology develops as the new ideas are 
introduced, discussed and become engrained. This is shown by its rapidly evolving vocabulary, 
which sees, in this period, a reduction in the use of NPG keywords such as transparency and 
consolidation, and the increase in use of the term accountability (Table 5).  
 
A journey towards governance? 2004-2008 
Over the last period under analysis there were fewer documents, fewer pages and fewer system-
related hits (Tables 2 and 3). Key themes of the period were particularly embedded in the 
Governance in Britain Green Paper of 2007. It contained a number of proposals relating to 
constitutional reform, and had an overarching aim of increasing citizens’ inclusion and 
participation in the managing of public services. The demand for enhanced forms of external 
accountability was also strongly addressed (Table 1). At the same time, preparation was ongoing 
for WGA (with the first set of WGA eventually produced in 2011).  
Due to the governance issues being discussed, the preparation for the consolidated 
WGA to be published in the future and the ongoing debate regarding the alignment of the key 
RAB documents, NPM ideas remained at the fore and discussions of NPG ideas accelerated 
strongly in these last four years (2004-2008). For example, 65.2% of all hits related to positive 
NPM (NPM1) cues (slightly down from the 68.7% in the previous period, see Table 2). While 
NPM words previously emphasised, such as resources and audit, showed a decrease, other words 
such as responsibility and process became more important (Table 5). This was possibly as a 
consequence of the stronger search for legitimation in the context of citizens and external 
stakeholders, something particularly emphasised in Governance in Britain. With respect to positive 
NPG cues (NPG1), these increased strongly as a percentage of total system-related hits (from 
8.5% to 13.2%, Table 2), and showed the highest percentage of cues in any of the four periods. 
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Further evidence of NPG’s rapidly developing vocabulary is seen in Table 5, with a major 
expansion of the use of the NPG keywords governance, participation and integration. Moreover, the 
use of accountability and transparency, which had emerged strongly in previous periods, remained 
solid. Similar to the previous period, PA-supporting arguments (PA1) remained relatively low at 
21.3% of hits (Table 2), below the average for the four periods, with the PA keyword citizen, 
which was almost unused in previous periods, accounting for 39.8% of PA hits (Table 5).   
In terms of co-occurrence, we see a change in how NPG arguments were presented. As 
indicated in Table 4, the highest percentage (in total) of NPG paragraphs represented 
standalones (40.3%), possibly indicating an emerging strength of the NPG ideas. However, care 
should be taken in interpreting this as: this was the period with the lowest number of documents 
and total hits, and positive NPG cues (NPG1) were still more likely to co-occur within 
paragraphs with positive NPM or PA cues (Table 4).   
 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS: LOOKING BACK AT THE PAST EIGHTEEN YEARS 
Looking at the four periods as a whole (1991-2008), we see a move from cash accounting, cash 
budgeting and strict annuality (PA ideas) to accrual accounting (live by 2001), accrual budgeting 
(live by 2003) and EYF (from 1997). Similarly, the expansion and focus on performance 
measurement and management, and the introduction of PSAs and SDAs in 1998, are indicative 
of NPM themes being embedded. These adjustments were features of a rolling programme of 
accounting reforms associated with NPM ideas between 1991 and 2008. However, the three sets 
of ideas, PA, NPM and NPG, associated with different reform packages, always co-existed 
(although to differing extents) over the eighteen years. The contention that an autonomous NPG 
paradigm has emerged in the UK in the last decade, as theorised by some authors (Osborne, 
2006 and 2010; Ackerman, 2012; and Prestoff et al., 2012), is not supported by the research that 
forms the basis of this paper. Differently, we find that in the UK, as PA has weakened (although 
not disappeared), NPM ideas have been consistently strong and have been augmented as NPG 
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ideas have been interwoven. NPG, rather than replacing NPM, complements and is an essential 
part of it. 
Among the three waves of reform, NPG represents the weakest and most recent. From a 
low commencement base in the early 1990s, it emerged more forcefully in the 2000s but, even 
then, the overall average occurrence of positive cues (NPG1) for the entire period (1991-2008) 
was by far the lowest of the three systems. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the most 
recurrent NPG terms in the UK central government scene actually cover aspects that previous 
literature has identified as borderline with NPM (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). For instance, both 
NPG and NPM reforms can be associated with the keyword consolidation, the most recurrent 
NPG cue over the last eighteen years (30.2% on average – see Table 5), and accountability (the 
second in terms of frequency, 21.9% on average). As indicated earlier in the paper, for analysis 
purposes, both consolidation and accountability were each viewed as NPG cues. Even doing this 
(which should ‘strengthen’ the NPG case), and reflecting on the consequent results, it is arguable 
as to whether NPG can be considered a new system of ideas in itself. The results seem to 
support the view that NPG is largely an adjustment of NPM reforms (Lapsley, 2008 and 2009; 
and Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). 
Some writers have argued that NPM ideas are more likely to be accepted by right-leaning 
governments (in a UK context, a Conservative government). However, there is very little 
evidence to support this in the data. At the initial stage of the period covered in this study, the 
Conservative party was in government (up to 1997). This was followed by a more centrist (or 
left-leaning) New Labour government (from 1997 to 2010). Ideas supporting NPM (NPM1), 
however, appear just as strongly in political debates in the later periods of this study (when a 
New Labour government was in power) as in the earlier periods (with a Conservative 
government – Tables 1 and 2). Moreover, many of the NPM-related accounting changes 
announced in the Conservative era were pushed through vigorously in the New Labour era 
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(Table 1). As Cutler (2007) and Lapsley and Midwinter (2010) argue in relation to the UK, there is 
clear evidence that NPM ideas were embraced enthusiastically by all governments.  
Interestingly, the study also highlights the substantial co-existence of multiple 
(supposedly alternative) public administration approaches and ideas. A possible explanation for 
this finding is that the process of reform in accounting, budgeting and performance 
measurement techniques has been generally characterised by a layering of the different ideas that 
complement, rather than supplant, each other over time. This reflects a pattern where new 
emerging structures and ideas are super-imposed (or layered) on pre-existing ones (Liguori, 
2012). This interpretation is consistent with what Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011, p.8) find during 
reform implementation, where ‘the detail of public sector reform often turns out to be more like 
geological sedimentation, where new layers overlie but do not replace or completely wash away 
the previous layer’. Our case shows that, at the level of political debate, changes appear to build 
on each other and suggest the grafting of new ideas onto existing systems. Adopting such a 
philosophy negates the need for negative arguments and explains the very limited presence of 
negative codes (i.e. arguments criticising any of the three reform streams). This highlights a 
general trend, where reforms are discussed in positive terms and introduced identifying their 
strengths, rather than the previous systems’ weaknesses. This would also explain the observed 
coexistence of accounting, budgeting and performance measurement systems relating to 
different reform waves, where both ‘old’ and ‘new’ system cues are present together.  
   
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Utilising extensive document analysis, and focusing on changes in accounting, budgeting and 
performance measurement in the UK central government over an eighteen-year period, this 
paper explores the use of reform vocabularies and the degree to which a movement towards 
NPG ideas can be identified in the political discussions regarding public sector accounting 
reforms. Besides the actual content of the reform decisions, the paper examines: the extent to 
 24 
 
which the vocabularies used to debate possible changes are related to the vocabularies of the 
three public administration systems; whether the systems are seen as mutually exclusive and/or 
competing in political discussions; and whether there is evidence of a movement over time from 
PA to NPM and then to NPG.  
Our research highlights very limited evidence to support Osborne’s (2010) argument that 
NPM is a transitory state in the evolution from a regime of traditional PA to NPG. The fact that 
the usage of the NPG vocabulary is weak (although increasing) places doubt over whether it can 
yet rightly be described as a self-standing, autonomous paradigm at all. Indeed, when one 
considers the main NPG keywords found in the research (Table 5), by far the most widely used 
were accountability and consolidation. Such words, arguably, could have been located in the NPM 
dictionary. Moreover, when the co-occurrence of PA, NPM and NPG is considered, the code 
‘NPG1 alone’ occurs only 29.7% of the times NPG cues are present (much lower than any other 
standalone code). In comparison, the combined code NPG1/NPM1 accounts for 41.6% of the 
times NPG occurs (Table 4), suggesting that NPG is more often associated with NPM ideas.  
In contrast, the analysis provides evidence that the rhetoric regarding accounting, 
budgeting and performance measurement reforms has predominantly used managerial 
arguments, irrespective of the political stances of the government in office. Considering the 
occurrence of the system-related cues for each of the three systems (PA, NPM and NPG), NPM 
is by far the most widely used in each of the four periods (Table 2), despite different 
governments being in power at different times. Moreover, when this is considered in tandem 
with the decided changes (Table 1), it largely shows a consistency between the tendency to use 
NPM cues and the decisions to introduce NPM-related changes. However, some care must be 
exercised in interpreting the results, because truly taken-for-granted topics require no 
justification and therefore do not easily surface in official discourses (Green, 2004). Therefore 
long-standing ideas (probably emanating from the time-honoured tradition of a PA system) may 
not need to be included in the arguments, tending to result in an understatement of adherence to 
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PA principles. This is consistent with the modest level of identification of PA occurrences, as 
discussed in the results. 
PA, NPM and NPG are often presented in the literature as mutually exclusive, 
competing systems. The evidence in this study suggests that this is not the case. If it were the 
case, one would expect, in political debate and discussion, arguments made against one system as 
support for change to another system. For example, arguments in favour of an NPM change 
(NPM1) would be made together with an argument against PA (PA2); the argument being that 
NPM changes are necessary replacements for outdated PA systems. This tendency occurs very 
infrequently. Instead, we often find arguments in favour of one system (for example, NPM) 
presented in the same paragraph as arguments in support of another system (for example, PA). 
This implies that NPM changes are often seen as supporting established PA systems and 
suggests that changes are not necessarily replacements of, but rather complements to, existing 
systems. This reflects a pattern of new emerging ideas super-imposed (layered or sedimented) on 
pre-existing ones rather than new emerging ideas replacing pre-existing ones (Liguori, 2012). As 
Streeck and Thelen (2005) suggest, the changes that are observed today are not merely minor 
adaptations of what has been before, but rather, through their accumulating impacts, resulting in 
a major recasting of systems. 
This paper contributes to the on-going debate on public sector reforms and the possible 
evolution towards an increasingly NPG-like approach. First, on the basis of the evidence from 
this research, we dispute the claim that NPM is a transitory state in the evolution from a regime 
of traditional PA to NPG. Instead, we concur with Lynn’s (2010) view, expressed when 
discussing the nature of NPG as a new paradigm of public administration, opining that any 
paradigm which does not require changes in political institutions and systems is doomed to be 
just another academic fashion. In our research, we find that political debates are still strongly 
framed within the ‘old’ NPM, rather than the ‘new’ NPG. Why NPM ideas have been so 
pervasive in discussions and debates surrounding public administration is still unclear, and 
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beyond the objective of this paper. After the Second World War there was a massive expansion 
in the role of the state across OECD countries. This was driven by rising expectations and 
demand for greater equality (Sanderson, 1996). However, in the last thirty years major changes 
have taken place in relation to the role, function and management of the public sector. From the 
1970s serious doubts began to be raised about the continued expansion of the state (Bovaird and 
Loffler, 2009; and Flynn and Strehl, 1996). These prompted the push for public sector reforms, 
with some seeing them in terms of improving the performance, transparency and accountability 
of the public sector (Flynn and Strehl, 1996), while others in terms of a fundamental questioning 
of the role of the state (Sanderson, 1996).  
Second, unlike the majority of studies on the topic, which focus on reform 
implementation and their unintended consequences, this research examines the political debate 
surrounding accounting-change decisions at the moment they are taken. The analysis suggests 
that the adoption of PA, NPM and NPG ideas is not as clear cut as some implementation studies 
have claimed. What we see in the UK political discussion of the past eighteen years is largely an 
NPM landscape, contoured with different aspects of NPM coming to the fore at different times 
(as particular changes are debated in the political arena) and the acknowledgement throughout 
that traditional PA and emerging NPG ideas also have validity. Rather than NPM ideas and tools 
completely replacing PA ones, we see NPM (and some NPG concepts) supplementing and 
complementing traditional systems. As Lynn (2012, p.119) has suggested, ‘whatever may be new 
will be rooted in soil that is very old indeed’. 
As in all studies, this research has limitations and can be augmented by further research. 
Firstly, our empirical focus is purely on the UK, an early and strong reform initiator. Other 
studies comparing across different countries, possibly with differing administrative cultures and 
traditions, would enrich the findings and help identify if a more or less linear trajectory exists in 
the move (if any) from PA to NPM and NPG systems. Secondly, the research relies almost 
totally on document analysis. Interviews with key actors in and around the decisions that are 
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taken regarding changes to accounting systems would provide additional insights. Finally, the 
research has looked at what the debate was, not why the debate occurred in the way it did and 
what the particular influencing factors were. Additional research could broaden the scope of 
analysis to periods before the 1990s in order to explore the existence and interplay of NPM and 
NPG ideas. Moreover, further research could investigate the level of ‘action’ (Brunsson, 1989) 
and actual implementation of the discussed changes, and the role played by organisational 
conditions in different countries. 
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NOTES 
 
1This does not deny the relevance of other communication arenas, such as the media (Meyer and Höllerer, 2010). 
However, as the area of financial and budgetary accounting reforms can be assumed to be ‘expert talk’, we expect 
these documents to be representative of the relevant arguments. 
 
2In the UK most accounting and budgeting changes do not pass through law, but rather are introduced through 
administrative acts. 
 
3The total number of hits for the three systems (PA, NPM and NPG) over the four periods was 13,447. 
 
4Although the initial 1998 timetable targeted 2006 as the first year where such accounts were to be produced, this 
was delayed until 2011. It has been argued that a combination of competing priorities, limited resources, the UK 
public sector moving to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and political and fiscal changes were 
largely responsible (Heald and Georgiou, 2011). 
 
5In the face of financial pressure, the government more recently argued that the end-year flexibility (EYF) system led 
to accumulated surpluses that would further increase the deficit if they were spent. As a consequence, the EYF 
system was discontinued from 2011-2012 (House of Commons, 2011). 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Main features of the UK accounting, budgeting and performance measurement 
reforms 
1991-1995
1994-95 
 Announced that resource (accrual) accounting and budgeting to be introduced in all government departments as 
part of the Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) changes (late 1990s – 1994 with the Green Paper, 1995 
with the White Paper - dry-run and transitional exercises to bed system down).  
 Announced that Statements of Resources by Departmental Aims and Objectives to be introduced in all government 
departments as part of the RAB changes – late 1990s dry-run and transitional exercises to bed system down. 
1996-1999
1997 
 End-year flexibility (EYF) introduced with respect to budget carry forward. 
1998 
 Treasury first published a scoping study for Whole of Government Accounts (WGA). 
 Performance-focused Public Service Agreements (PSAs) and Service Delivery Agreements (SDAs) introduced 
as a key-aspect of a quasi-contract between the Treasury and government departments. 
 Treasury-led Spending Reviews initiated to set firm and fixed spending budgets over several years for each 
government department. 
2000-2003
2001 
 Resource (accrual) accounting ‘live’ in all central government departments. 
 Statements of Resources by Departmental Aims and Objectives required to be produced as part of the RAB changes in 
all central government departments.  
2003 
 Resource (accrual) budgeting ‘live’ in all central government departments 
2004-2008
2007 
 Government discussion paper published with the objective of facilitating better accountability of public bodies 
to parliament and to the public.  
 Announced that financial accounting of government departments to be based on IFRS. 
 Clear Line of Sight (CLOS) project commenced aimed at getting better alignment of accounting and budgeting 
information.  
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Table 2: Reform cues in the UK political debate - a time comparison 
91-95 
PA1* PA2 NPM1 NPM2 NPG1 NPG2 Total 
360** 52 1,253 15 98 7 1,785 
20.2% 2.9% 70.2% 0.8% 5.5% 0.4% 100% 
96-99 
PA1 PA2 NPM1 NPM2 NPG1 NPG2 Total 
1,763 116 2,677 37 330 4 4,927 
35.8% 2.4% 54.3% 0.8% 6.7% 0.1% 100% 
00-03 
PA1 PA2 NPM1 NPM2 NPG1 NPG2 Total 
1,103 203 4,226 95 521 4 6,152 
17.9% 3.3% 68.7% 1.5% 8.5% 0.1% 100% 
04-08 
PA1 PA2 NPM1 NPM2 NPG1 NPG2 Total 
124 2 380 0 77 0 583 
21.3% 0.3% 65.2% 0.0% 13.2% 0.0% 100% 
Total 
(all periods)  
PA1 PA2 NPM1 NPM2 NPG1 NPG2 Total 
3,350 373 8,536 147 1,026 15 13,447 
24.9% 2.8% 63.5% 1.1% 7.6% 0.1% 100% 
*supporting codes – PA1, NPM1 and NPG1 codes vs. criticising or challenging codes – PA2, NPM2 and PG2 
**number of absolute counts 
 
Table 3: Reform cues in the UK political debate - average per page 
Counts Average per page 
Total Pages PA1* NPM1 NPG1 PA1   norm NPM1 norm NPG1 norm 
91-95 345 360 1,253 98 1.04 3.63 0.28 
96-99 1,083 1,763 2,677 330 1.63 2.47 0.30 
00-03 891 1,103 4,226 521 1.24 4.74 0.58 
04-08 121 124 380 77 1.02 3.14 0.64 
Total 
(all periods) 2,440 3,350 8,536 1,026 1.37 3.50 0.42 
* supporting codes – PA1, NPM1 and NPG1 codes 
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Table 4: Reform cues and co-occurrences in the UK political debate - a time comparison 
PA 
91-95 
PA1/
NPM1* 
PA1/
NPG1 
PA1
alone 
PA1/NPM1
/NPG1 Other 
292 paragraphs 155** 3 109 9 16
% of code combinations 53.1% 1.0% 37.3% 3.1% 5.5%
96-99 
1,421 paragraphs 593 57 654 61 56 
% of code combinations 41.7% 4.0% 46.0% 4.3% 3.9% 
00-03 
942 paragraphs 557 28 253 60 44 
% of code combinations 59.1% 3.0% 26.9% 6.4% 4.7% 
04-08 
112 paragraphs 35 11 60 6 0 
% of code combinations 31.3% 9.8% 53.6% 5.4% 0.0% 
Total counts 2,767 paragraphs 1,340 99 1,076 136 116 
Period average % of code combinations 48.4% 3.6% 38.9% 4.9% 4.2% 
NPM 
91-95 
NPM1/ 
PA1 
NPM1/ 
NPG1 
NPM1 
alone NPM1/ PA1/NPG1 
NPM1/ 
PA2 Other 
740 paragraphs 155* 46 486 9 37 7 
% of code combinations 20.9% 6.2% 65.7% 1.2% 5% 0.9% 
96-99 
1,758 paragraphs 593 87 902 61 95 20 
% of code combinations 
33.7% 4.9% 51.3% 3.5% 5.4% 1.1% 
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00-03 
2,702 paragraphs 557 233 1666 60 147 39 
% of code combinations 20.6% 8.6% 61.7% 2.2% 5.4% 1.4% 
04-08 
225paragraphs 35 23 160 6 1 0 
% of code combinations 15.6% 10.2% 71.1% 2.7% 0.4% 0.0% 
Total counts 5,425 paragraphs 1,340 389 3,214 136 280 66 
Period average % of code combinations 24.7% 7.2% 59.2% 2.5% 5.2% 1.2% 
NPG 
91-95 
NPG1/
NPM1 
NPG1/
PA1 
NPG1
alone 
NPG1/
PA1/NPM1 Other 
91 paragraphs 46* 3 30 9 3 
% of code combinations 50.5% 3.3% 33.0% 9.9% 3.3% 
96-99 
310 paragraphs 87 57 96 61 9 
% of code combinations 28.1% 18.4% 31.0% 19.7% 2.9% 
00-03 
468 paragraphs 233 28 125 60 22 
% of code combinations 49.8% 6.0% 26.7% 12.8% 4.7% 
04-08 
67 paragraphs 23 11 37 6 0 
% of code combinations 34.3% 16.4% 40.3% 9.0% 0.0% 
Total counts 936 paragraphs 389 99 278 136 34 
Period average % of code combinations 41.6% 10.6% 29.7% 14.5% 3.6% 
* supporting codes – PA1, NPM1 and NPG1 codes vs. criticising or challenging codes – PA2, NPM2 and PG2 
**number of absolute counts 
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Table 5: Main accounting-related keywords used in the UK political debate, 1991-2008 
PA 1991-1995 1996-1999 2000-2003 2004-2008 Entire period 
% Keyword Counts % Counts % Counts % Counts % 
Cash/commitment 307 26.8% 1,042 18.1% 583 21.2% 2 0.6% 19.4% 
Citizen 4 0.3% 10 0.2% 14 0.5% 125 39.8% 1.5% 
Expenditure 306 26.7% 1,725 29.9% 694 25.2% 41 13.1% 27.7% 
Procedures 48 4.2% 1,023 17.8% 164 6.0% 15 4.8% 12.5% 
Requirement 135 11.8% 374 6.5% 281 10.2% 12 3.8% 8.0% 
Rules 31 2.7% 313 5.4% 135 4.9% 17 5.4% 5.0% 
Spending 125 10.9% 809 14.0% 445 16.2% 50 15.9% 14.3% 
Overall PA word counts  1,147 5,762 2,750 314 9,973 
NPM 1991-1995 1996-1999 2000-03 2004-2008 Entire period 
% Keyword Counts % Counts % Counts % Counts % 
Audit/Auditing 170 6.8% 510 7.1% 1,485 18.7% 15 1.9% 11.9% 
Cost 418 16.7% 1090 15.3% 428 5.4% 42 5.4% 10.8% 
Independence/independent/autonomo
us 24 1.0% 159 2.2% 508 6.4% 24 3.1% 3.9% 
Objective 166 6.6% 426 6.0% 186 2.3% 52 6.6% 3.4% 
Performance 120 4.8% 225 3.2% 482 6.1% 70 9.0% 4.9% 
Process 91 3.6% 296 4.1% 374 4.7% 78 10.0% 4.6% 
Resources (in RAB terms) 774 30.9% 2,552 35.8% 2,204 27.7% 97 12.4% 30.6% 
Managerial responsibility/ 
responsibility centre 100 4.0% 251 3.5% 286 3.6% 55 7.0% 3.8% 
Target 37 1.5% 134 1.9% 198 2.5% 34 4.3% 2.2% 
Overall NPM word counts  2,503 7,133 7,949 782 18,367 
NPG 1991-1995 1996-1999 2000-2003 2004-2008 Entire period 
% Keyword Counts % Counts % Counts % Counts % 
External accountability 30 12.1% 122 16.6% 351 26.1% 50 25.3% 21.9% 
Consolidation/consolidated 120 48.4% 375 51.0% 263 19.6% 4 2.0% 30.2% 
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Governance 0 0.0% 2 0.3% 25 1.9% 69 34.8% 3.8% 
Integration/integrated 6 2.4% 10 1.4% 6 0.4% 13 6.6% 1.4% 
Negotiation/ consultation (with 
external stakeholders) 83 33.5% 5 0.7% 185 13.8% 5 2.5% 11.0% 
Network 1 0.4% 11 1.5% 5 0.4% 11 5.6% 1.1% 
Participation/participative 1 0.4% 24 3.3% 35 2.6% 15 7.6% 3.0% 
Transparency/transparent 3 1.2% 123 16.7% 116 8.6% 18 9.1% 10.3% 
Overall NPG word counts  248 736 1,343 198 2,525 
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Appendix 1 
Keywords identification 
 
Traditional PA System NPM System NPG System 
 bureaucratic/ bureaucracy 
 citizen 
 rules/norms/ requirement 
 compliance 
 cash/ commitments 
 administrator/ bureaucrat 
 execute/ executor 
 hierarchy/ hierarchical  
 neutral 
 objectivity/ objective/ impartial  
 expenditure/ spending  
 procedures 
 central(ised) 
 function 
 independence 
 NPM/managerialisation 
 efficiency 
 effectiveness 
 output/results/outcomes 
 satisfaction 
 customers/client 
 managers/managerial 
 strategy 
 performance/performance 
measures/indicator/target/objective  
 accruals/resources/value for money 
 contract/PPP/PFI 
 quality/appropriateness 
 expenses 
 audit/auditing 
 cost/amortisation 
 process 
 flexibility 
 decentralised/devolved 
 independence/independent/autonomous  
 managerial responsibility/responsibility centre 
 ‘public business’ 
 market 
 corporatisation/agencies/agencification 
 competition/tendering/ benchmarking  
 privatisation 
 deregulation 
 governance 
 transparency/transparent  
 external accountability 
 stakeholder 
 network 
 partnership/partners  
 sustainability/sustainable 
 ethic 
 equity/social fairness 
 participation/participative 
 integration/integrated 
 consolidation/ consolidated 
 negotiation/consultation (with external stakeholders) 
 civil society/non-profit/third sector 
 
 
